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Abstract
Do trade agreements with labor provisions affect trade differently from those without 
such provisions? Are their effects heterogeneous with respect to the level of development 
of the countries involved and the labor intensity of goods traded? In this paper we 
implement a state-of-the-art structural gravity model with intra-national trade and allow 
for heterogeneous effects depending on the level of enforceability of labor provisions 
(weak vs. strong provisions), sector (labor vs. non-labor intensive goods), members’ 
development level (North vs. South), and combinations of the three dimensions. We show 
that, overall, the trade effects of trade agreements with labor provisions are larger than 
those without. However, we also fi nd that while exports from the South to the North 
display a signifi cant increase after a signature of a trade agreements with no or weak labor 
provisions, this is not the case if strong labor provisions are included in the agreement, 
and that such difference tend to be larger for labor-intensive goods.
Keywords: international trade, trade agreements, labor provisions, structural gravity 
models.
JEL classifi cation: F13, F14, F16.
Resumen
¿Los acuerdos comerciales con disposiciones laborales afectan al comercio de 
manera diferente a como lo hacen aquellos sin tales disposiciones? ¿Son sus efectos 
heterogéneos con respecto al nivel de desarrollo de los países involucrados y la intensidad 
laboral de los bienes comercializados? En este trabajo implementamos un modelo de 
gravedad estructural de última generación con comercio intranacional y permitimos 
efectos heterogéneos según el nivel de aplicabilidad de las disposiciones laborales 
(provisiones débiles vs. fuertes), el sector (bienes intensivos en mano de obra vs. bienes 
no intensivos en mano de obra), nivel de desarrollo de los miembros (Norte vs. Sur), y 
combinaciones de las tres dimensiones. Mostramos que, en general, los efectos sobre 
el comercio de los acuerdos comerciales con disposiciones laborales son mayores que 
los que no las tienen. Sin embargo, también encontramos que, si bien las exportaciones 
Sur-Norte muestran un aumento signifi cativo después de la fi rma de un acuerdo comercial 
sin disposiciones laborales o con disposiciones laborales “débiles”, esto no sucede si se 
incluyen disposiciones laborales “fuertes” en el acuerdo, y que tal diferencia tiende a ser 
mayor para los bienes intensivos en mano de obra.
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, acuerdos comerciales, disposiciones laborales, 
modelos de gravedad estructural.
Códigos JEL: F13, F14, F16.
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1 This means the inclusion in the treaties of references to core labor standards and other ILO instruments, 
and mechanisms for enforcement, implementation and cooperation. Their incorporation into the 
agreements is usually done through specific “social” or “labor” chapters, or side-agreements. For further 
details, see Raess and Sari (2020). 
 
1. Introduction 
Do trade agreements with labor provisions affect trade differently from those without 
such provisions? Are their effects heterogeneous with respect to the level of 
development of the countries involved and the labor-intensity of goods traded? 
Tying trade to labor rights and other labor-related provisions has been a “long-standing 
contentious issue” in World Trade Organization talks (Summers, 2001). However, since 
the deadlock of WTO-wide negotiations in the early 2000s, both the overall number of 
trade agreements and the amount of those including labor provisions, i.e. legal clauses 
meant to promote labor market and working conditions and reinforce labor rights in the 
signatory countries,1 increased steeply (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Trade agreements with labor provisions, 1995-2015 
 
Note: “TALP” identifies trade agreement with labor provisions. “TA (no LP)” identifies all the rest of trade 
agreements. Columns represent the number of trade agreements signed in the corresponding year. The 
line represents the cumulative number of trade agreements with labor provisions in force. “TA (no LP)” 
cumulative should be multiplied by ten to obtain the number of “TA (no LP)” in force. The year represents 
the year of entry into force. 





















TA (no LP) TALP
TA (no LP; x10; cumulative; r.h.s.) TALP  (cumulative; r.h.s.)
Labor provisions included in trade agreements are expected to affect the ability of 
exporting through different channels, linked to both production costs and productivity. 
On one side, the inclusion of labor provisions in a trade agreement may increase the 
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2 Using highly disaggregated trade data (HS 6 digit), Nicita and Murina (2017) and Timini and Conesa (2018) 
provide additional evidence in the direction of the possible existence of such channel for the specific case 
of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. 
cost of labor, to comply with higher standards, and consequently dampening exports’ 
competitiveness (Busse, 2002). On the other side, labor provisions may have beneficial 
effects on labor productivity (e.g. OECD, 2013; ILO, 2017), by the means of a variety of 
factors: from higher worker satisfaction to lower rates of accidents at work, from 
stimulating innovation and investment in human capital by firms to enhance their 
governance. Further, enhancing labor provisions may influence foreign demand, as far 
as consumers and firms from importing economies are concerned with human and 
worker conditions in exporting economies. These effects are strongly emphasized in 
Carrère et al. (2017).2 
Indeed, despite a number of recent scholarly efforts (e.g. ILO, 2016; Carrère et al., 2017; 
Jinji and Kamata, 2020), the sign and size of the effect of trade agreements with labor 
provisions on trade is still unclear, and object of discussion in both academic and policy 
environments. 
To contribute to this ongoing debate, we estimate a state of the art structural gravity 
model with consistently estimated intra-national trade flows, to further explore the 
effects of trade agreements with labor provisions on bilateral exports. In our analysis, 
we differentiate between non-enforceable (or weakly enforceable, henceforth “weak”) 
and legally enforceable (henceforth, “strong”) labor provisions, and explicitly allow for 
heterogeneity with respect to both the sector (labor vs. non-labor intensive goods) and 
the level of development of each country (North vs. South). 
In line with previous research, our results show that, on average, trade agreements with 
labor provisions have larger (positive) effects on bilateral manufacturing trade flows, 
compared to trade agreements with no labor provision. However, our novel 
contribution is to uncover and explore the heterogeneity both across sectors and level 
of development. Importantly, we show that while exports from the South to the North 
display a significant increase after the entry into force of a trade agreements with no (or 
weak) labor provisions, this is not the case if strong labor provisions are included in the 
agreement. This difference tends to be larger in labor-intensive sectors. 
Our study contributes to two different strands of the literature. First, our paper 
complements the research focused on the new generation of trade agreements, i.e. 
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“deep” trade agreements (Orefice and Rocha, 2014; Kohl et al., 2016; Osnago et al., 
2017; Ahcar and Siroën, 2019; Osnago et al., 2019; Boffa et al., 2019; Brandi et al., 2020; 
Heid and Vozzo, 2020; Laget et al., 2020), by expanding the understanding of the impact 
of trade agreements with labor provisions on trade flows. Second, by taking a more fine-
grained approach and using sectoral trade data, our contribution speaks to the literature 
on the impacts of trade agreements on trade. Our paper shows that sectoral data is 
important in studying the relation between trade agreements and trade flows given the 
substantial heterogeneity the aggregate flows hide. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first in implementing such approach for trade agreements with labor provisions 
specifically.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 summarizes the literature 
on the effects of trade agreements with labor provisions; Section 3 describes the data 
and the empirical strategy used; Section 4 presents and discusses the results (including 
a battery of robustness tests), and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review: trade agreement, labor provisions and standards, and 
trade 
The nature of the relationship between trade and labor standards is a long-standing and 
widely debated topic. Given its widening policy relevance and the increasing availability 
of data, there is a large and growing body of literature on the issue. 
Previous contributions fall mostly in two main groups. On one side, a number of 
contributions have focused on analyzing the relationship between trade agreements 
with labor provisions and countries’ labor standards or other labor market conditions 
(such as minimum wage, unemployment benefits, etc.; see, e.g. Kamata, 2014; Kamata, 
2015; and Martinez-Zarzoso and Kruse, 2019). Most studies show mixed results, with 
trade agreements with labor provisions influencing only certain labor market and 
working condition indicators (e.g. minimum wage, unemployment rate, 
composite/proxy measures of labor rights). 
On the other side, various studies have investigated the effect of labor standards and 
provisions on trade flows. Previous research has shown empirically that a change in 
nation-wide labor standards have heterogeneous effects on the trade performance of a 
country. Busse (2002) and Busse and Braun (2004) indicate that forced and child labor 
increase the endowment of labor, positively affecting exports by reinforcing exporters’ 
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3 Head and Mayer (2014) explains in detail what a “naïve” gravity model means. In short, the most 
important characteristic of a “naïve” gravity is that it does not take into account explicitly the multilateral 
trade resistances, something that Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) demonstrate as a potential source of bias. 
However, we should acknowledge that, at the time, Kucera and Sarna’s (2006) approach was the standard 
in the literature. 
4 The expression “deep trade agreements” refers to trade agreements including different sets of 
provisions other than tariff reductions. For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution and characteristics 
of deep trade agreements, see Mattoo et al. (2020). 
5 The standard approach in the literature is to include the former as exporter-time and importer-time 
fixed effects, and the latter as (directional) pair fixed effects. 
comparative advantage, particularly in labor-intensive goods. Using a “naïve” gravity 
model,3 Kucera and Sarna (2006) find that labor rights (and specifically trade union 
rights) have a strong positive relationship with total bilateral manufacturing exports. 
However, they also show that this strong association would be concentrated in non-
labor-intensive products. In their analysis, exports of labor-intensive goods show either 
a zero or negative association with labor rights.  
Relatedly, in parallel with the analysis on and understanding of the so-called “deep” 
trade agreements,4 the research on the effects of trade agreements with labor 
provisions on trade is developing fast. However, the literature has so far provided mixed 
evidence.  
Using a “naïve” gravity model, ILO (2016) find that both trade agreements with and 
without labor provisions have positive effects on bilateral merchandise exports, and 
while the point estimate of the former group is larger than that of the latter, they are 
not statistically different. Additionally, ILO (2016) does not find support for differential 
effects related to the level of development (“North” and “South”). However, the analysis 
by ILO (2016) suffers from some important shortcomings as neither multilateral trade 
resistances (MTRs), i.e. exporter’s and importer’s overall “market thickness” (Fally, 
2015), nor unobservable bilateral time invariant trade costs are controlled for.5 The 
biases arising from their exclusion are discussed in Baldwin and Taglioni (2007), Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), and Egger and Nigai (2015), and summarized in Yotov et al. 
(2016). Particularly, accounting for unobservable bilateral time invariant trade costs 
allows to better control for endogeneity, which is expected to bias the “trade agreement 
effect” estimates upwards, as countries may be more likely to sign a trade agreement 
with large (rather than small) trade partners. The recent sensitivity analysis conducted 
by Ahcar-Olmos and Rodriguez-Barco (2020) confirm the existence and direction of such 
bias. Additionally, the failure of properly accounting for the asymmetric nature of such 
bilateral trade costs is another source of bias. As argued by Waugh (2010), this is 
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particularly important for directional estimates, and especially “South-North” vs. 
“North-South” trade, as exporters from the “South” systematically incur in higher trade 
costs relative to exporters from the North.  
Differently from ILO (2016), Carrère et al. (2017) effectively control for MTRs, but only 
include observable (symmetric) bilateral trade costs (such as distance, contiguity, 
common language, etc.), and decide to tackle endogeneity issues related to trade 
agreements by restricting the sample to those country pairs with a trade agreement in 
force. They further reduce the sample by income levels to estimate three out of four 
geographical combinations: North-North, South-South and South-North (but not North-
South). They find that, overall, trade agreements with labor provisions do not have 
different effects from their control group (trade agreements without such provisions) 
on manufacturing exports. However, the authors do find a differential (positive) effect 
in the case of South-North exports. Given the reduced sample used for their analysis, it 
is unclear whether these findings are generalizable and comparable to the rest of the 
gravity literature. 
Kamata (2014) uses OLS estimation techniques to estimate a pseudo-gravity model in 
first differences that departs from the rest of the gravity literature (and incurs in several 
potential sources of biases mentioned in Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007). Kamata’s model 
explains total real bilateral trade flows with exporter’s and importer’s GDP, two lagged 
trade agreement dummies, and year fixed effects. On the basis of the results of this 
model, Kamata (2014) argues that trade agreements with labor provisions have smaller 
effects, if any, on “South-to-North” exports (with respect to a trade agreement without 
labor provisions).  
Jinji and Kamata (2020) use both OLS and poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood 
estimation strategy and include intra-national trade flows, a relatively recent advance in 
the gravity literature, to estimate the effect of a trade agreement with labor provisions 
on bilateral manufacturing exports. Apart from using own estimates of intra-national 
trade flows,6 they depart from the literature by using real export values and lagged 
(instead of contemporaneous) trade policy variables. With these settings, Jinji and 
Kamata (2020) show seemingly counterintuitive results.7 On the one hand, in their 
                                                          
6 While Jinji and Kamata (2020) acknowledge that they use gross output data from UNIDO, it is not clear 
how they deal with the considerable number of missing data in the UNIDO database. 
7 Given the possible biases in OLS estimations arising from heteroscedasticity, we focus on poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation results. However, the OLS results are similarly puzzling. 
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poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimations they find that trade agreements with 
legally enforceable labor provisions have larger positive effects on trade than 
agreements with no such provisions. These effects are mostly concentrated in North-
North trade, possibly capturing the “European Union effect”. On the other hand, trade 
agreements with weak (i.e. non-legally enforceable) labor provisions tend to have a 
smaller impact (w.r.t agreements with no such provisions), if any. The impact on North-
North trade would be negative. Limited explanations are offered on the possible drivers 
of these results. 
Previous contributions have pushed forward our understanding of the nature and 
characteristics of trade agreements with labor provisions and already offered some 
insights on their effects on trade, whose size and direction are however still debated. 
Due to the advances in structural gravity models and availability of more detailed data, 
we are able to provide a novel perspective on this contested issue. 
In this context, we tackle a number of issues so far remained unaddressed in the 
literature. First, we aim to provide unbiased estimates of the effect of trade agreements 
with labor provisions on bilateral trade flows. To do so, we implement a state of the art 
structural gravity model, with theory-coherent MTRs, unobservable asymmetric 
bilateral time invariant trade costs, and intra-national trade estimated in a consistent 
way. Second, we allow for heterogeneous effects of trade agreements with labor 
provisions, by checking if their impact depends on the countries and sectors involved. 
Accounting for the level of development of the countries involved is relevant given the 
heterogeneous level of labor standards particularly for North-South and South-North 
trade relations, as large differences exist among trade partners’ regulations and 
provisions, and economies in the South tend to have fewer labor rights (see Figure A.1 
in the Appendix). Estimating sectoral gravity equations (labor-intensive vs. non-labor 
intensive sectors; and ISIC two-digit sectors) is an important step as trade agreements 
with labor provisions may have heterogeneous effects on production factors (labor vs. 
capital).  
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Data  
Trade data are from the “International Trade and Production Database for Estimation” 
(ITPD-E). This database contains yearly bilateral trade flows for 243 countries and 120 
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8 While the database also includes agricultural, mining and service data, we limit our analysis to 
manufacturing trade for the following reasons: to ensure comparability with similar studies (e.g. Busse, 
2002; Busse and Braun, 2004) and across sectors (as, e.g., agricultural sectors are not codified using ISIC 
classification); to cope with the lack of information on the labor intensity of agricultural production (both 
within agricultural sectors, and between, e.g., agriculture and manufacturing). Trade in services is often 
treated separately due to their different nature (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2018). 
(four-digit International Standard Industrial Classification [ISIC] rev.3) manufacturing 
sectors since the year 2000, constructed in an homogeneous and consistent way, and 
includes intra-national trade flows.8 Note that in the ITPD-E, flows are reconciled, and 
the value of exports from i to j in t is equal to the value of j’s imports from i. For further 
details, we refer to Borchert et al. (2020). 
Trade agreements information is retrieved from the World Bank Horizontal Depth 
Database (Hofmann et al., 2017), which provides data on the content of trade 
agreements, including the coverage of labor provisions. The World Bank Database not 
only includes information on whether or not a trade agreement includes reference to 
labor provisions, but also whether or not these provisions are legally enforceable. We 
exploit this additional information in our analysis.  
Bilateral distance, WTO and EU membership, are taken from the geography database by 
CEPII; the measure of “depth” of a trade agreement from Dür et al. (2014), and tariffs 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. All these variables are used in 
robustness checks. Summary statistics are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
3.2. Empirical strategy  
We follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Head and 
Mayer (2014), and Yotov et al. (2016) in implementing a state-of-the-art structural 
gravity model to assess the effect of trade agreements with labor provisions on exports 
flows. Gravity models explain bilateral trade flows by transaction costs and economic 
size, while controlling for MTRs and endogeneity issues. There are several theoretical 
properties of structural gravity models that allow us to maintain a simple empirical 
framework even if considering labor intensive and non-labor intensive sectors: indeed, 
structural gravity controls for country-specific factors such as the level of productivities 
(Ricardian comparative advantage through technology differences), or the level of factor 
endowments (Heckscher-Olhin comparative advantage through endowment 
differences). To this extent, Deardoff (1998) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) respectively 
show that also in a Heckscher-Olhin or Ricardian framework, the gravity equation is 
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9 As demonstrated by Arkolakis et al. (2012), and summarized in Yotov et al. (2016), “a large class of 
models generate isomorphic gravity equations” (p. 13). 
10 For more details on other aspects of gravity models, we refer to Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) and Yotov 
et al. (2016).  
practically identical,9 and including capital-labor ratio (or other similar measures such 
their difference) would not be warranted by the theory. Additionally, as summarized by 
Feenstra and Taylor (2017), such measures of factor endowment ratios do not deliver 
consistent results if there are more than two production factors (e.g. land, labor and 
capital) or if different types of labor exist. Additionally, gravity models are separable 
(Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Anderson and Yotov, 2010):  this means that a 
theory-consistent gravity equation can be estimated separately for each sector or by 
pooling sectors together (while adapting bilateral costs and MTRs to the existence of 
sectors).10 We therefore perform different sets of estimations, using aggregate bilateral 
trade, and separating exports of goods of different labor intensity. We use the 
classification applied by Busse (2002) and Busse and Braun (2004), based on OECD 
(2001), and widely adopted by studies dealing with trade and labor intensity. This 
classification divides products from the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) into two categories: labor-intensive and non-labor intensive products. Using this 
information, we link products to four-digit ISIC rev. 311 (see Table A.2 in Appendix for 
more details). This dichotomous classification helps us in understanding whether there 
are any differences across these two broadly-defined sectors. In this sense, and to 
alleviate the computational burden, we aggregate the ITPD-E data up to the 
aforementioned two sectors: labor intensive and non-labor intensive goods.12 However, 
as a robustness test, we will complement the analysis by running (two-digit ISIC) sector-
level regressions, to both ensure the validity of our aggregation and check if a more 
disaggregated analysis can provide additional insights (by treating labor intensity in a 
more continuous way).  
In all our specifications, we use a poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimating 
procedure, as proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), to properly address the 
presence of zeros and heteroscedasticity, two features typical of trade data. 
                                                      
11 We use the conversion tables available from Eurostat to translate SITC codes in ISIC. Importantly, the 
classification by Busse (2002) and Busse and Braun (2004) is based on three-digit SITC codes. In most of 
the cases, a three-digit SITC code can be univocally linked to a single four-digit ISIC code. When this is not 
possible (roughly 25% of the codes used in the Busse classification), the most frequent four-digit ISIC code 
is used. 
12 The original ITPD-E data for manufacturing corresponds to more than 34.6 million observations. 
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Our more conservative specification can be written as follows: 
             (1) 
where  are manufactured exports (either aggregate, labor intensive or non-labor 
intensive) of country i to  country j at time t. Following Yotov (2012), Dai et al. (2014) 
and Larch et al. (2018),   include intra-national (i.e. domestic) trade flows ( ,  i=j). 
In this way, we account for possible domestic-to-international trade diversion effects. 
Indeed, a trade agreement alters both relative costs among foreign markets (members 
vs. non-members) and between the domestic market and the markets of foreign 
signatory partners.  is a dummy variable and it is equal to 1 when countries i and j 
have a trade agreement in force at time t, and zero otherwise, independently of the 
provisions included in the agreement. In equation (1) then, we are simply measuring the 
“average treatment effect” of signing a trade agreement on trade. In line with structural 
gravity theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), we include exporter-time ( ), 
importer-time ( ) fixed effects, to properly control for MTRs (as their omission can 
introduce a bias in the estimates of [trade policy] elasticities), and directional-pair fixed 
effects ( ). Importantly, the latter control for asymmetric trade costs and trade 
imbalances (Waugh, 2010).   is consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2007) strategy 
to deal with trade policy endogeneity. Finally, we follow Egger and Tarlea (2015) and use 
three-way clustered standard errors (by exporter, importer, and time).  
We then proceed to gradually disentangle the “average” trade agreement effect in 
different categories, separating by labor provisions (existence and strength) and 
development (North vs. South) characteristics. 
In equation (2) below, we use equation (1) as a starting point, and allow for 
heterogeneous effects of trade agreements with and without labor standards. We do so 
by splitting the  dummy in two:  
             (2) 
Here,  is a dummy variable, and it is equal to 1 when countries i and j have a 
trade agreement without labor provisions in force at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 is also a dummy variable, and it is equal to 1 when countries i and j have a trade 
agreement with labor provisions in force at time t, and zero otherwise. This means that 
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13 For further details on the methodology used for assembling the Horizontal Depth database, please refer 
to Hofmann et al. (2017). 
  (3) 
Here,  is defined as above.  is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 when countries i and j have a trade agreement with weak labor provisions in force 
at time t, and zero otherwise. In the same fashion,  identifies trade 
agreements with strong labor provisions. 
We then allow for heterogeneous effects of trade agreements depending on the level 
of development of trade agreement members. More in details, we follow Boffa et al. 
(2019) and Heid and Vozzo (2020) and separate countries into advanced and emerging 
and developing countries. Following the extant literature on similar subjects (i.e. trade 
and development, see Melitz, 2003; Anson et al., 2005; Montout and Zitouna, 2005; 
UNCTAD, 2006; Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013; Vicard, 2013; Disdier et al., 2015), we 
label these two groups “North” and “South”. The “North” corresponds to high-income 
OECD or EU members.14 We separate then the exports relations in four groups: North-
North, South-South, North-South, and South-North. The directional separation of North-
South and South-North is important given the heterogeneity in the burden that labor 
provisions may pose for exporters in the North and in the South (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 
2013; Disdier et al., 2015). As above, all the coefficients are interpretable as “level” 
effects. 
14 Given our period of analysis, 2000-2015, and in line with most of the literature analyzing a similar period, 
we label as “North” high-income OECD or EU members, more precisely:  Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel, 
Korea (Rep. of), Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, United States, and EU members. We prefer 
not to separate EU members between “North” and “South” as the EU has a common trade policy stance, 
known as “Common Commercial Policy” or “EU Trade Policy”. Main results, however, are not sensible to 
the inclusion of the EU “New Members States” (i.e. 2004 accession) in the “South”. 
both coefficients  and  represent the “level” increase in bilateral trade due to 
 and   respectively. The sum of the two variables captures the 
universe of trade agreements in our sample ( ). 
We further separate trade agreements with labor provisions in two groups: one with 
non-legally enforceable labor provisions, such as vague reference to some guiding 
principles or based on weak legal language (e.g. “should encourage”; “recognize the 
importance”; “shall work jointly to encourage and support”); and the other with legally 
enforceable labor provisions. These two groups are already codified differently in the 
Horizontal Depth database.13 
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4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
The main results from the structural gravity model estimated with poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood techniques are presented in Table 1. Our first result (Column 1.a), 
in line with most research, we find that, on average, trade agreements ( ) boost 
bilateral trade between members, by approximately 10% (i.e. 100*[ ). On 
average, this effect is mostly concentrated on non-labor intensive products (Column 1.b 
and 1.c). When we separate trade agreements between those without ( ) and 
those with labor provisions ( ) (Columns 2.a-2.c), and then further isolate trade 
agreements with weak ( ) and strong labor provisions ( ) 
(Columns 3.a-3.c), we find that the trade effect of agreements with strong provisions 
(that includes the EU) outperforms the others, particularly for non-labor intensive 
goods. These results are in line with those of a recent strand of the literature arguing 
that “new generation” agreements tend to have larger economic impacts with respect 
to the rest (Kohl et al., 2016; Ahcar and Siroën, 2019; Laget et al., 2020). In Columns 4.a-
4.c and Columns 5.a-5.c, we further disentangle the effects by level of development of 
the trade agreement members. When doing so, we uncover the existence of important 
heterogeneity across type of agreements and level of development of its members. 
North-North trade flows increase as a consequence of both trade agreements without 
labor provisions ( ) and those with strong labor provisions 
( ). However, such effects tend to be concentrated on non-labor 
intensive goods for the latter. North-South exports increase as a result of the entry into 
force of any of the three types of trade agreements considered (without 
[ ], with weak [ ], or with strong labor provisions 
[ ]). These effects are concentrated in non-labor-intensive goods. 
South-North exports show very different patterns depending on the type of trade 
agreement signed: trade agreements without labor provisions ( ) boost 
South-North exports of labor-intensive goods; trade agreements with weak labor 
provisions ( ) promote South-North non-labor-intensive exports; 
whereas trade agreements with strong labor provisions do not have any positive effect 
on South-North exports ( ). In other words, this means that there is 
a substantial difference among trade agreement types in terms of trade creation. This is 
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Table 1: Trade agreements with labor provisions and trade flows 
 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Fixed effects and constants not reported 
for the sake of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the exporter, importer and 
time level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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TAijt 0.0972** -0.0002 0.121***
(0.0411) (0.102) (0.0377)
TA_NO_LPijt 0.0505 -0.0415 0.0777 0.0509 -0.0417 0.0785
(0.0761) (0.172) (0.0552) (0.0765) (0.172) (0.0558)
TA_LPijt 0.143*** 0.0434 0.163**
(0.0544) (0.0505) (0.0665)
TA_LP_WEAKijt 0.104 0.123*** 0.0938
(0.0675) (0.0430) (0.0713)
TA_LP_STRONGijt 0.175*** 0.00814 0.227***
(0.0642) (0.0640) (0.0739)
TA_NO_LP_NNijt 0.138* 0.106 0.123 0.142** 0.106 0.127
(0.0735) (0.0873) (0.0797) (0.0707) (0.0870) (0.0792)
TA_LP_NNijt 0.119* 0.0812* 0.127
(0.0691) (0.0486) (0.0824)
TA_LP_WEAK_NNijt 0.00759 0.109** -0.00878
(0.0421) (0.0472) (0.0428)
TA_LP_STRONG_NNijt 0.215*** 0.0701 0.255***
(0.0742) (0.0651) (0.0796)
TA_NO_LP_NSijt 0.148** 0.0366 0.170*** 0.149** 0.0395 0.170***
(0.0607) (0.146) (0.0510) (0.0598) (0.145) (0.0511)
TA_LP_NSijt 0.254** 0.0534 0.263**
(0.123) (0.0979) (0.116)
TA_LP_WEAK_NSijt 0.347* 0.114 0.351**
(0.178) (0.179) (0.164)
TA_LP_STRONG_NSijt 0.134** 0.0317 0.145**
(0.0596) (0.103) (0.0611)
TA_NO_LP_SNijt 0.0983** 0.333*** 0.0640 0.106** 0.335*** 0.0713
(0.0479) (0.0971) (0.0545) (0.0489) (0.0970) (0.0570)
TA_LP_SNijt -0.0132 0.0761 -0.00930
(0.0789) (0.105) (0.0777)
TA_LP_WEAK_SNijt 0.139** 0.200 0.118*
(0.0567) (0.146) (0.0612)
TA_LP_STRONG_SNijt -0.177** -0.0775 -0.159*
(0.0770) (0.115) (0.0883)
TA_NO_LP_SSijt -0.0487 -0.309 0.0195 -0.0481 -0.308 0.0206
(0.140) (0.218) (0.111) (0.140) (0.218) (0.111)
TA_LP_SSijt 0.282*** -0.0954 0.421***
(0.0609) (0.0822) (0.0877)
TA_LP_WEAK_SSijt 0.342*** 0.151*** 0.376***
(0.0738) (0.0462) (0.0913)
TA_LP_STRONG_SSijt 0.262*** -0.166* 0.436***
(0.0860) (0.0925) (0.106)
EXPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IMPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
DIR. PAIR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 669,633 587,744 656,783 669,633 587,744 656,783 669,633 587,744 656,783 669,633 587,744 656,783 669,633 587,744 656,783
TA TA_noLP and TA_LP
TA_noLP, TA_LP_WEAK
and TA_LP_STRONG
Col. 2 + North-North; North-South; 
South-North; South-South 
Col. 4 + North-North; North-South; 
South-North; South-South 
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evident in the case of South-North exports: trade agreements with labor provisions tend 
to curb exports of the South, especially when labor provisions are legally enforceable. 
These results echo the findings of other papers looking at the effects of the “new 
generation” of trade agreements on South-North total manufacturing trade, such as 
Disdier et al. (2015) and Anson et al. (2005), focusing on standard harmonization and 
rules of origins respectively. The authors of the two paper find that the non-tariff 
measures contained in the “new generation” agreements act as a brake to trade 
expansion, partially or totally undoing traditional trade promoting effects. Finally, trade 
agreements with labor provisions (  and ) are 
promoting South-South trade. However, the positive effects of those with strong labor 
provisions (  are concentrated in non-labor intensive goods. 
Generally, our findings show that trade increase along the line of traditional trade 
theory: trade liberalization induces countries to specialize in the production of goods in 
which they enjoy a comparative advantage. This advantage could emerge, mainly, from 
differences in both the relative factor endowments (a la Heckscher-Ohlin) and the 
institutional and regulatory frameworks (Nunn and Trefler, 2014; Baghdadi et al., 2013). 
Such advantages are reduced in the case that trade liberalization policies have 
conditions, i.e. labor provisions, attached.  
In our robustness checks we focus on disentangling potential confounding factors so to 
reduce our concerns for possible omitted variable bias. The results of an alternative set 
of specifications are reported in Table 2. 
Therefore, we tackle the possible existence of confounding factors related to 
unobserved time-varying bilateral trade costs by including additional variables with 
variation at the exporter-importer and time level in the regression. In brief, we account 
for: the “depth” of the trade agreement, i.e. an index accounting for provisions other 
than labor included in the trade agreement; WTO membership of the pair; importer 
tariffs; or the “EU effect”. Additionally, we also follow Bergstrand et al. (2015) and 
implement three alternative specifications by including: a time-varying bilateral distance 
effect, i.e. an interaction between bilateral distance and year dummies; a time-varying 
“globalization effect”, i.e. an interaction between the “international border”15 and year 
dummies; and a combination of the two. 
                                                          
15 The international border dummy is equal to 1 if exporter is different from the importer, and 0 otherwise. 
4.2. Robustness tests 
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16 Results are robust to the alternative measure proposed by Dür et al. (2014), which relies on latent trait 
analysis. 
Our main results do not change across specifications. Specifically, while the sign of 
certain variables may change due to the very high number of fixed effects inserted in 
the regressions, the difference between the effect of trade agreements without labor 
provisions and those with (strong) labor provisions on exports from the South to the 
North remain stable across all specifications: the  effect tend to be larger 
than that of , and particularly so for labor-intensive exports. 
More in details, in Column 1, we include an index that measures the “depth” of a trade 
agreement, by summarizing relevant chapters, clauses and provisions included in the 
agreement other than labor provisions. In this way, we make sure – in the best possible 
way – that the effect captured by our trade agreement dummies is not reflecting other 
provisions. We use the (normalized) additive index proposed by Dür et al. (2014),16 a 
standard approach used by research on similar issues (e.g. Egger et al., 2015; Brandi et 
al., 2020). The index takes into account whether or not a trade agreement includes 
substantive provisions across its most relevant policy areas: tariffs (reduction to zero, 
with only few exceptions allowed), standards, services, investment, public procurement, 
                                                          
competition, and intellectual property rights. Importantly, as mentioned above, the 
index does not include labor provisions. While in the literature there is no consensus yet 
on the sign and significance of “depth”, we note that in our sample the “depth” of a 
trade agreement does not have a significant effect on bilateral manufacturing trade. 
In Column 2, we take into account WTO membership, by including a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if both the exporter and the importer are WTO members at time t, and 
zero otherwise. The WTO dummy is not significant. This is not surprising considering a 
number of issues: first, our sample starts in 2000, and the multilateral trading system 
has achieved little results since; second, Esteve-Pérez et al. (2020) recently argue that 
the average WTO effect on trade is not significantly positive, although this may be only 
covering very heterogeneous effects (Felbermayr et al., 2020). 
In Column 3, we include tariffs. We use applied tariff data, simple mean for 
manufacturing products.17 The tariffs coefficient can be expressed in terms of trade 
elasticity of substitution . The value of  (3.6) that can be extracted from 
17 We also use interchangeably applied tariff data (weighted mean); and MFN (both simple and weighted 
mean) for manufacturing products in a set of alternative regressions (not reported in the text). Main 
results are not sensible to these changes. 
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the regression corresponding to total bilateral manufacturing trade is very close to the 
value indicated by Bajzik et al. (2020) as a result of a meta-analysis of the literature, and 
Bernard et al. (2003) estimation results. 
In Column 4, we separate the EU, a special type of trade agreement with labor 
provisions. Even if we previously took into account the existence of deep trade 
agreements, we separate the EU to provide a further “accuracy check” on our estimates. 
In line with the literature, the EU (enlargement) effect ( ) is large, positive, and 
significant for total bilateral manufacturing trade, and larger than the average trade 
agreement effect (  in Column 1.a, Table 1). 
In Column 5 we include an interaction between bilateral distance and year dummies. In 
this way we allow bilateral distance effect to have a time-varying effects. This allows to 
disentangle reductions in bilateral trade costs that are not strictly related to the signing 
of a trade agreement, but rather to a wider process of trade integration. 
In Column 6, we insert an interaction between the international border variable, defined 
as a dummy that take value 1 if the bilateral trade relation is international, i.e. if the 
exporter is different from the importer, and 0 otherwise, and year dummies. Such 
interaction allows to capture any time-varying effect that affect intra-national 
(domestic) and international trade differently. In short, this would allow to discern the 
trade agreement effect from “globalization-related” trade effects, i.e. general 
reductions in international trade costs occurring over time and unrelated to the trade 
agreement. 
In Column 7 we enter in the regression the two effects simultaneously. 
Additionally, we complement the analysis by running individual (two-digit ISIC) sector-
level regressions, to both ensure the validity of our aggregation (based on Busse, 2002) 
of labor-intensive and non-labor intensive sectors. With this further robustness check, 
we also consider if a sector-specific analysis can provide additional insights. 
For sake of brevity, we report the full regression results in Table A.3 in the Appendix, 
together with complementary visual and descriptive analysis (Figure A.2 and Figure A.3, 
and text thereafter), but we summarize the main points of this robustness check here. 
The sector-level findings reinforce our main conclusion: the effect of trade agreements 
without labor provisions on exports from the South to the North is larger than that of 
trade agreements with strong labor provisions, especially in labor-intensive sectors (for 
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Table 2: Trade agreements with labor provisions and trade flows, robustness tests 
 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Fixed effects and constants not reported for the sake of simplicity. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the exporter, importer and time level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7












































TA_NO_LP_NNijt 0.0825 0.0403 0.0947 0.142** 0.106 0.127 0.132* 0.0928 0.118 0.140** 0.106 0.124 0.0554 -0.0505 0.0485 0.0987 0.0375 0.0848 0.0797 -0.0204 0.0737
(0.103) (0.121) (0.111) (0.0705) (0.0872) (0.0792) (0.0716) (0.0927) (0.0796) (0.0702) (0.0872) (0.0791) (0.0942) (0.119) (0.102) (0.0800) (0.0958) (0.0904) (0.0942) (0.126) (0.104)
TA_LP_WEAK_NNijt -0.0714 0.0202 -0.0517 0.00810 0.110** -0.00823 0.00157 0.107** -0.0143 0.00735 0.109** -0.00908 -0.103** -0.118 -0.109** -0.0495 -0.00470 -0.0616 -0.0734* -0.0669 -0.0787*
(0.0762) (0.156) (0.0761) (0.0429) (0.0476) (0.0419) (0.0333) (0.0474) (0.0412) (0.0308) (0.0475) (0.0347) (0.0496) (0.127) (0.0542) (0.0444) (0.0720) (0.0491) (0.0400) (0.110) (0.0450)
TA_LP_STRONG_NNijt 0.166** 0.0173 0.229** 0.215*** 0.0702 0.256*** 0.203*** 0.0612 0.242*** 0.187*** 0.0347 0.229*** 0.132** -0.0213 0.173** 0.141** -0.000631 0.177**
(0.0847) (0.105) (0.0891) (0.0742) (0.0651) (0.0796) (0.0740) (0.0647) (0.0794) (0.0711) (0.0582) (0.0769) (0.0666) (0.0550) (0.0714) (0.0684) (0.0569) (0.0739)
TA_NO_LP_NSijt 0.108 -0.00236 0.147** 0.149** 0.0355 0.170*** 0.109* 0.0253 0.128** 0.151** 0.0400 0.172*** 0.0980 -0.0817 0.127** 0.0993 -0.0612 0.126** 0.0943 -0.0857 0.123**
(0.0820) (0.182) (0.0708) (0.0595) (0.142) (0.0508) (0.0622) (0.155) (0.0528) (0.0601) (0.144) (0.0516) (0.0635) (0.149) (0.0515) (0.0716) (0.150) (0.0619) (0.0717) (0.155) (0.0611)
TA_LP_WEAK_NSijt 0.277* 0.0366 0.313** 0.347* 0.114 0.351** 0.320* 0.0755 0.325* 0.347* 0.114 0.351** 0.287 -0.0377 0.300* 0.311 0.00924 0.320* 0.303 -0.0277 0.315*
(0.149) (0.196) (0.143) (0.178) (0.179) (0.164) (0.192) (0.192) (0.177) (0.178) (0.179) (0.164) (0.208) (0.159) (0.175) (0.189) (0.178) (0.174) (0.193) (0.167) (0.179)
TA_LP_STRONG_NSijt 0.0630 -0.0434 0.106 0.135** 0.0318 0.146** 0.138** 0.0407 0.151*** 0.133** 0.0311 0.143** 0.108 0.0164 0.120 0.124* 0.0269 0.136* 0.121 0.0253 0.135
(0.0814) (0.193) (0.0792) (0.0599) (0.103) (0.0621) (0.0565) (0.108) (0.0563) (0.0622) (0.103) (0.0642) (0.0811) (0.111) (0.0797) (0.0750) (0.109) (0.0737) (0.0897) (0.115) (0.0901)
TA_NO_LP_SNijt 0.0643 0.287** 0.0486 0.105** 0.334*** 0.0706 0.0752 0.316*** 0.0340 0.106** 0.335*** 0.0711 0.0412 0.279*** 0.00621 0.0421 0.291*** 0.00389 0.0344 0.280** -0.00134
(0.0732) (0.121) (0.0835) (0.0489) (0.0968) (0.0572) (0.0480) (0.0966) (0.0548) (0.0491) (0.0969) (0.0566) (0.0545) (0.0975) (0.0653) (0.0561) (0.111) (0.0645) (0.0622) (0.112) (0.0701)
TA_LP_WEAK_SNijt 0.0724 0.132 0.0816 0.139** 0.199 0.118** 0.0959* 0.181 0.0689 0.138** 0.199 0.117** 0.0614 0.121 0.0440 0.0714 0.144 0.0497 0.0546 0.123 0.0358
(0.0957) (0.187) (0.102) (0.0568) (0.146) (0.0598) (0.0547) (0.137) (0.0584) (0.0577) (0.146) (0.0591) (0.0669) (0.147) (0.0777) (0.0613) (0.134) (0.0683) (0.0723) (0.143) (0.0747)
TA_LP_STRONG_SNijt -0.246** -0.148 -0.198 -0.176** -0.0769 -0.159* -0.202*** -0.0828 -0.188** -0.177** -0.0776 -0.159* -0.223** -0.176 -0.205 -0.194** -0.111 -0.178* -0.214** -0.161 -0.193
(0.112) (0.168) (0.123) (0.0775) (0.115) (0.0893) (0.0749) (0.108) (0.0892) (0.0770) (0.114) (0.0892) (0.104) (0.122) (0.127) (0.0783) (0.106) (0.0913) (0.107) (0.130) (0.131)
TA_NO_LP_SSijt -0.0791 -0.338 0.00319 -0.0488 -0.309 0.0198 -0.108 -0.367* -0.0385 -0.0479 -0.308 0.0208 -0.0677 -0.310 -0.00855 -0.0711 -0.324 -0.00665 -0.0859 -0.324 -0.0282
(0.152) (0.255) (0.116) (0.140) (0.217) (0.111) (0.141) (0.219) (0.112) (0.140) (0.218) (0.111) (0.137) (0.232) (0.117) (0.129) (0.205) (0.103) (0.146) (0.227) (0.127)
TA_LP_WEAK_SSijt 0.294*** 0.0948 0.349*** 0.342*** 0.150*** 0.376*** 0.279*** 0.138*** 0.306*** 0.342*** 0.151*** 0.376*** 0.275*** 0.0858 0.312*** 0.289*** 0.0875 0.321*** 0.279*** 0.0748 0.316***
(0.0875) (0.125) (0.103) (0.0735) (0.0461) (0.0913) (0.0701) (0.0434) (0.0871) (0.0739) (0.0461) (0.0912) (0.0739) (0.0676) (0.0914) (0.0852) (0.0608) (0.0983) (0.0953) (0.0750) (0.108)
TA_LP_STRONG_SSijt 0.220** -0.214 0.414*** 0.264*** -0.166* 0.439*** 0.265*** -0.162** 0.452*** 0.263*** -0.166* 0.437*** 0.0255 -0.240 0.0844 0.199*** -0.255*** 0.376*** 0.00473 -0.239 0.0608
(0.100) (0.152) (0.111) (0.0849) (0.0923) (0.104) (0.0784) (0.0809) (0.0951) (0.0860) (0.0925) (0.106) (0.209) (0.252) (0.215) (0.0711) (0.0949) (0.0866) (0.226) (0.244) (0.235)
DEPTHijt 0.0783 0.0881 0.0426
(0.0822) (0.150) (0.0809)
WTOijt 0.0703 0.0842 0.0732
(0.123) (0.134) (0.128)
TARIFFijt -3.592*** -1.876 -3.938***
(1.270) (1.447) (1.320)
TA_LP_STRONG_NN_noEUijt -0.00352 -0.0104 -0.00918
(0.0749) (0.118) (0.0806)
EUijt 0.248*** 0.0765 0.298***
(0.0757) (0.0665) (0.0796)
EXPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IMPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
DIR. PAIR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
DISTANCE*YEAR NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES
INTL. BRDR. * YEAR NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 669,633 587,744 656,783 669,633 587,744 656,783 473,677 427,221 466,729 669,633 587,744 656,783 607,491 538,660 596,919 669,633 587,744 656,783 607,491 538,660 596,919
Dist. tr. + Int. bord.*yearDepth WTO membership Tariffs EU effect Distance trend International border * year
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example in sectors such as manufacturing of textile, ISIC 17, and of wearing apparel, ISIC 
18).  
To summarize, our main results do not vary across specifications, and sector-level 
regressions are in line with and support the results based on more aggregate export 
data. In particular, the effect of trade agreements without labor provisions on exports 
from the South to the North is larger than that of trade agreements with strong labor 
provisions, and particularly so for labor-intensive exports.
5. Conclusions 
During the last decades, we have witnessed a proliferation of trade agreements 
incorporating specific provisions related to labor rights and working conditions. These 
agreements may have different economic consequences than the rest. Indeed, trade 
agreements with labor provisions may affect the “institutional comparative advantage” 
(Nunn and Trefler, 2014) of (labor abundant) countries. Due to the increasing relevance 
of bilateral (rather than WTO-wide) trade integration, this can have important 
repercussions on the evolution of global trade flows and economic interconnections.  
Our paper contributes to this literature by testing empirically the effect of trade 
agreements with labor provisions on bilateral trade flows. We allow for heterogeneous 
effects depending on the level of enforceability of labor provisions (weak vs. strong 
provisions), sector (labor vs. non-labor intensive goods), level of development (North vs. 
South), and combinations of the three dimensions. We do so by implementing a state-
of-the-art structural gravity model with intra-national trade. 
In line with previous research, our results show that, on average, trade agreements with 
labor provisions have larger (positive) effects on aggregate bilateral manufacturing 
trade flows, with respect to trade agreements without them. However, our novel 
contribution is to uncover an important degree of heterogeneity both at the sector and 
members’ development level. Importantly, we show that while exports from the South 
to the North display a significant increase after a signature of a trade agreements with 
no or non-enforceable labor provisions, this is not the case if strong labor provisions are 
included in the agreement. Such difference tends to be larger for labor-intensive goods. 
This represents an important contribution on the consequences of trade agreements 
with labor provisions on South-North trade relations, above and beyond those on other 
non-tariff measures (Anson et al., 2005; Disdier et al., 2015).  
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Such finding provides also some interesting insights both for policy-makers and the 
academic community. In terms of policy implications, for an exporter from the South, 
on one hand, the signing of a trade agreement without labor provisions with an importer 
in the North implies large, positive and significant effects on its exports, particularly of 
labor-intensive goods. On the other hand, if the same trade agreement includes strong 
labor provisions, this is likely to have no positive effect on South-North exports. 
In terms of venues for further research, the effect of trade agreements with labor 
provisions should be investigate in more detail, leveraging the availability of firm-level 
information. Besides, exploring the relation between changes in different aspects of 
trade policy and the evolution of the industrial structure and export composition could 
offer crucial contributions for guiding policy choices in the future. 
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Appendix 
FIGURE A.1 Labor rights in the North and in the South 
 
Note: The figure shows the Kucera and Sari (2019) synthetic indicator for freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights in law and practice for the year 2000 (the first year of our sample). Importantly, 
the original indicator has an inverse relationship with the level of labor rights: it ranges between 0 and 10, 
being 0 the best score and 10 the worst score. We linearly transform the index to have a direct relationship 
between labor rights and the indicator level (best score: 10; worst score: 0). See http://labor-rights-
indicators.la.psu.edu/about for more details on the index. North and South are defined as in the text. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Kucera and Sari (2019). 
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TABLE A.1 Summary statistics 
VARIABLE OBSERVATIONS MEAN ST.DEV. MIN MAX 
Exports (aggregate) 672,791 547.72 25620.88 0 9214964 
Exports (lab. Int.) 672,791 63.72 2931.12 0 1001829 
Exports (non-lab. Int.) 672,791 483.99 22769.96 0 8213136 
TAijt 672,791 0.096 0.294 0 1 
TA_NO_LPijt 672,791 0.059 0.236 0 1 
TA_LPijt 672,791 0.036 0.187 0 1 
TA_LP_WEAKijt 672,791 0.009 0.095 0 1 
TA_LP_STRONGijt 672,791 0.027 0.163 0 1 
TA_NO_LP_NNijt 672,791 0.0017 0.041 0 1 
TA_LP_WEAK_NNijt 672,791 0.0004 0.020 0 1 
TA_LP_STRONG_NNijt 672,791 0.0162 0.126 0 1 
TA_NO_LP_NSijt 672,791 0.0122 0.110 0 1 
TA_LP_WEAK_NSijt 672,791 0.0011 0.034 0 1 
TA_LP_STRONG_NSijt 672,791 0.0045 0.065 0 1 
TA_NO_LP_SNijt 672,791 0.0122 0.110 0 1 
TA_LP_WEAK_SNijt 672,791 0.0011 0.034 0 1 
TA_LP_STRONG_SNijt 672,791 0.0044 0.066 0 1 
TA_NO_LP_SSijt 672,791 0.0332 0.179 0 1 
TA_LP_WEAK_SSijt 672,791 0.0063 0.079 0 1 
TA_LP_STRONG_SSijt 672,791 0.0022 0.047 0 1 
 
TABLE A.2 List of labor-intensive goods (as in Busse, 2002) 
COMMODITY SITC code ISIC code (correspondence) 
Fabric and textile yearn 65 
1711; 1721; 1722; 1723; 1729; 1730; 
1810; 2109; 2430; 2519; 2610; 3699 
Glassware, glass and pottery 664-666 2610; 2691 
Bedding and furniture 82 1721; 3610 
Handbags and travel goods 83 1912 
Apparel 84 1730; 1810; 1820; 2519; 2520 
Footwear 85 1920 
Games, toys, baby carriages, and sporting goods 894 3693; 3694; 3699 
Note: We use the conversion tables available from Eurostat to translate SITC codes in ISIC. Importantly, the 
classification by Busse (2002) is based on three-digit SITC codes. In most of the cases, a three-digit SITC code can be 
univocally linked to a single four-digit ISIC code. When this is not possible (roughly 25% of the codes used in the Busse 
classification), the most frequent four-digit ISIC code is used. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Busse (2002). 
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Table A.3: Trade agreements with labor provisions and trade flows, two-digit ISIC. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector ISIC sector

































































TA_NO_LP_NNijt 0.127** 1.893*** 0.146 0.240 -0.0703 -0.214 -0.408 -0.0473 0.385** 0.245*** -0.0119
(0.0500) (0.182) (0.137) (0.211) (0.216) (0.208) (0.259) (0.135) (0.152) (0.0578) (0.0536)
TA_LP_WEAK_NNijt 0.0994** 0.143 0.0727 -0.335* 0.324*** -0.0155 0.0624 0.142 0.624*** 0.0872 0.122
(0.0463) (0.164) (0.103) (0.197) (0.0958) (0.121) (0.137) (0.0944) (0.111) (0.106) (0.0800)
TA_LP_STRONG_NNijt 0.608*** 1.721*** 0.100 -0.0702 -0.0834 0.127* 0.174** 0.0840 0.196 0.347** 0.243**
(0.134) (0.344) (0.110) (0.173) (0.175) (0.0756) (0.0846) (0.160) (0.137) (0.141) (0.105)
TA_NO_LP_NSijt -0.0887 0.482** 0.181 -0.772** -0.348 0.197 0.0108 -0.00430 0.472*** 0.146* 0.121
(0.0730) (0.237) (0.168) (0.340) (0.269) (0.136) (0.0698) (0.102) (0.100) (0.0813) (0.0772)
TA_LP_WEAK_NSijt 0.197** 0.0491 0.130 0.390 0.185 -0.266 0.0172 -0.0755 0.353 0.104 0.0793
(0.0873) (0.172) (0.190) (0.469) (0.240) (0.218) (0.128) (0.183) (0.217) (0.122) (0.0707)
TA_LP_STRONG_NSijt 0.140 -0.412* 0.195 -0.0742 0.0166 0.0290 0.189* 0.000218 0.301 -0.0638 0.183**
(0.123) (0.236) (0.151) (0.290) (0.116) (0.148) (0.102) (0.100) (0.198) (0.0795) (0.0851)
TA_NO_LP_SNijt 0.119 0.414 0.322* 0.610*** 0.322*** 0.268** 0.0511 -0.134 0.115 0.139 0.207***
(0.0731) (0.312) (0.182) (0.197) (0.109) (0.119) (0.0679) (0.144) (0.114) (0.0905) (0.0647)
TA_LP_WEAK_SNijt 0.216*** 0.264 0.181 0.276 0.319 0.555*** 0.0334 -0.0366 0.0123 0.150 0.235***
(0.0606) (0.440) (0.149) (0.182) (0.212) (0.117) (0.127) (0.142) (0.170) (0.0964) (0.0599)
TA_LP_STRONG_SNijt 0.0640 -0.0175 -0.0803 -0.129 0.303*** 0.192* 0.201* -0.217** -0.609*** 0.160** 0.487**
(0.0865) (0.203) (0.181) (0.136) (0.104) (0.115) (0.119) (0.0848) (0.145) (0.0641) (0.207)
TA_NO_LP_SSijt 0.133 0.383 -0.208 -0.739** -0.796*** -0.299* -0.159 -0.152* -0.00757 0.0920 -0.0357
(0.0966) (0.282) (0.163) (0.327) (0.296) (0.153) (0.147) (0.0907) (0.0731) (0.0780) (0.199)
TA_LP_WEAK_SSijt -0.149 -0.136 0.208*** -0.0319 0.221** 0.415** 0.157* -0.154 0.405 0.0159 0.118
(0.187) (0.368) (0.0790) (0.0957) (0.0869) (0.204) (0.0849) (0.196) (0.418) (0.0730) (0.101)
TA_LP_STRONG_SSijt 0.562*** 1.117*** 0.0343 -0.770*** -0.426*** -0.0360 0.0580 0.173 0.197 0.544*** 0.346***
(0.151) (0.417) (0.156) (0.254) (0.143) (0.0520) (0.162) (0.159) (0.165) (0.156) (0.111)
EXPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IMPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
DIR. PAIR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 497,868 217,084 473,186 470,725 404,975 364,900 386,290 418,931 298,311 504,961 477,843
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TA_NO_LP_NNijt 0.559*** 0.0297 0.369 0.177 -0.0877 0.492** -0.326* -0.0907 -0.0807 0.416** 0.755**
(0.163) (0.113) (0.317) (0.121) (0.174) (0.232) (0.169) (0.118) (0.0574) (0.165) (0.382)
TA_LP_WEAK_NNijt 0.0793 0.151 0.316*** 0.157*** 0.0763 0.144 -0.457*** 0.0796 0.242* 0.138 -0.258**
(0.0714) (0.236) (0.0577) (0.0457) (0.140) (0.129) (0.0748) (0.200) (0.147) (0.141) (0.121)
TA_LP_STRONG_NNijt 0.186** 0.358*** 0.331*** 0.0835 0.370** 0.216 0.0680 0.293** 0.00403 -0.261 0.470***
(0.0878) (0.0945) (0.0790) (0.138) (0.158) (0.139) (0.130) (0.125) (0.145) (0.168) (0.126)
TA_NO_LP_NSijt 0.0263 0.508 0.0303 0.0542 -0.115 0.0406 0.00975 0.0799 0.173 -0.189 0.238
(0.112) (0.337) (0.0575) (0.0616) (0.1000) (0.0781) (0.0532) (0.0750) (0.126) (0.167) (0.202)
TA_LP_WEAK_NSijt -0.0555 0.669*** 0.125 -0.000141 -0.444** -0.119 0.0765 0.257*** -0.0153 -0.426** 0.672***
(0.0931) (0.126) (0.0911) (0.0470) (0.199) (0.173) (0.202) (0.0564) (0.0831) (0.202) (0.213)
TA_LP_STRONG_NSijt -0.142** 0.0835 0.149 0.0608 0.468*** 0.272** 0.191* 0.0975 0.172* -0.296 -0.117
(0.0701) (0.0637) (0.0944) (0.0660) (0.149) (0.126) (0.107) (0.0701) (0.0956) (0.193) (0.125)
TA_NO_LP_SNijt 0.147 0.0984 0.304** 0.136** -0.118 0.0753 -0.178* 0.121* 0.128 0.289* 0.0338
(0.109) (0.0927) (0.124) (0.0540) (0.160) (0.105) (0.0998) (0.0667) (0.128) (0.166) (0.0884)
TA_LP_WEAK_SNijt -0.0407 0.571*** 0.243* 0.201* -0.0688 0.0676 -0.305** 0.365** 0.00737 0.432* 0.219*
(0.150) (0.157) (0.144) (0.113) (0.214) (0.125) (0.138) (0.168) (0.117) (0.256) (0.122)
TA_LP_STRONG_SNijt -0.263* -0.0115 0.331*** 0.479*** -0.314*** 0.444*** 0.0435 -0.197 0.543*** -0.0557 0.137
(0.146) (0.166) (0.110) (0.129) (0.0684) (0.158) (0.280) (0.133) (0.168) (0.404) (0.193)
TA_NO_LP_SSijt -0.0896 0.0740 -0.0445 -0.0747 -0.359** -0.143 0.0544 -0.273** 0.348*** 0.0844 -0.721**
(0.150) (0.0941) (0.141) (0.131) (0.162) (0.129) (0.171) (0.117) (0.133) (0.250) (0.316)
TA_LP_WEAK_SSijt 0.0286 0.724*** 0.191** 0.120** 0.312*** 0.207** 0.325* -0.0680 0.706*** -0.130 -0.0214
(0.0818) (0.206) (0.0795) (0.0544) (0.0961) (0.102) (0.193) (0.0815) (0.180) (0.283) (0.0914)
TA_LP_STRONG_SSijt -0.201* 0.468*** 0.160 0.326*** 1.010* 0.394*** 0.936*** 0.673** 0.706*** 0.294*** 0.276
(0.112) (0.116) (0.120) (0.111) (0.561) (0.115) (0.268) (0.342) (0.122) (0.106) (0.194)
EXPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IMPORTER-TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
DIR. PAIR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 408,929 385,949 482,820 514,455 417,367 480,005 453,422 445,665 452,194 352,221 475,656
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FIGURE A.2: Association between capital intensity and South-North trade agreement 
effects 
 
Note: “Group 1” includes those sectors where the TA_noLP_SN effect is positive and significant, and the 
TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is either not statically significant or negative and significant. It also includes 
sectors where the TA_noLP_SN effect is not statistically significant and the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is 
negative and significant. “Group 2” includes those sectors where the TA_noLP_SN and 
TA_STRONG_LP_SN are both positive and significant, both not statistically significant, or both negative 
and significant. “Group 3” includes those sectors where the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is positive and 
significant, and the TA_noLP_SN effect is either not statically significant or negative and significant. It also 
includes sectors where the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is not statistically significant and the TA_noLP_SN 
effect is negative and significant. ISIC sector 23, “manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel” is excluded. Capital intensity is calculated as capital per employee. See text for further 
details. 
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FIGURE A.3: Association between South-North trade agreement coefficients and 
capital intensity 
a. Trade agreements without labor provisions (TA_noLP_SN) 
 
b. Trade agreements with “weak” labor provisions (TA_LP_WEAK_SN) 
 
c. Trade agreements with “strong” labor provisions (TA_LP_STRONG_SN) 
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As stated in Section 4.2, our sector-level regressions (see Table A.3) support the findings 
of a larger effect of trade agreements without labor provisions on exports from the 
South to the North with respect to that of trade agreements with strong labor 
provisions, and especially so for labor-intensive sectors.  
Figure A.2 and Figure A.3 provide two visual summaries of the information contained in 
Table A.3 for South-North trade agreements. In both figures, we associate the sector-
level capital-intensity (capital per employee) with the effects of trade agreements with 
and without labor provisions on trade.    
More in details, in Figure A.2, we compare the distributions of the interquartile ranges 
of sector-level factor intensity for three mutually exclusive groups of South-North trade 
agreement effects.18 The first group, labelled “Group 1”, contains sectors where the 
effect of trade agreements without labor provisions are “stronger” than those of trade 
agreements with strong labor provisions. The second group, labelled “Group 2” contains 
sectors where the effects are “similar”. The third group, labelled “Group 3”, contains 
sectors where the effect of trade agreements without labor provisions is “weaker” than 
that of trade agreement with strong labor provisions.  
More precisely, “Group 1” includes those sectors where the TA_noLP_SN effect is 
positive and significant, and the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is either not statically 
significant or negative and significant. It also includes sectors where the TA_noLP_SN 
effect is not statistically significant and the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is negative and 
significant. “Group 2” includes those sectors where the TA_noLP_SN and 
TA_STRONG_LP_SN are both positive and significant, both not statistically significant, or 
both negative and significant. “Group 3” includes those sectors where the 
TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is positive and significant, and the TA_noLP_SN effect is 
either not statically significant or negative and significant. It also includes sectors where 
the TA_STRONG_LP_SN effect is not statistically significant and the TA_noLP_SN effect 
is negative and significant. The advantages of this classification lie on its mutually 
exclusive categories and on its computational ease, as the categories can be directly and 
manually calculated from Table A.3. 
                                                          
18 The box plot reported in Figure A.2 shows the distribution of factor intensity for each group defined as 
in the text. For each group, the graph shows the median (the line within the box), the 25th and 75th 
percentile range (the limits of the box), and the upper and lower adjacent values (lines emerging from the 
box, above and below respectively). 
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Sector-level factor intensity is computed following Bustos (2011): we build a measure of 
factor intensity for each two-digit ISIC industry using the NBER-CES Manufacturing 
Industry Database that correspond to the capital to labor ratio.19 Therefore, the lower 
the number, the lower the capital intensity (and the higher the labor intensity), and vice 
versa. We take 1995 as reference year for calculations.20 
Then, Figure A.2 provides a simple graphical representation of the association between 
capital intensity and the South-North trade agreement effects, showing that “Group 1” 
effects tend to be associated with industries with higher level of labor intensity (i.e. 
lower level of capital intensity), such as, for example, manufacturing of textiles, wearing 
apparel, luggage, and footwear, or leather-related industries. “Group 3” effects tend to 
be associated with industries with lower level of labor intensity (i.e. higher level of 
capital intensity), such as, for example, manufacturing of chemical products. “Group 2” 
effects are associated with industries whose labor intensity lies somewhat in the middle. 
In Figure A.3, we compare the distributions of the interquartile ranges of trade 
agreement coefficients from sector regressions divided by quartiles of sector capital 
intensity.21 Figure A.3 shows two important features in support of our main findings. 
First, the relation between the distribution of coefficients and the capital intensity 
within the same type of agreement. In the case of trade agreements without labor 
provisions (Figure A.3a), the median effect is decreasing with capital intensity. In other 
words, the effects of these treaties tend to be larger in sectors with higher labor 
intensity (lower capital intensity). In the case of trade agreements with strong labor 
provisions (Figure A.3c), the relationship is increasing: the effects of these treaties tend 
to be larger in sectors with lower labor intensity (higher capital intensity). In the case of 
trade agreements with weak labor provisions (Figure A.3b), the relation is similar to that 
of trade agreements without labor provisions, however the pattern is fuzzier. 
                                                          
19 The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database provides data on the real capital stock in millions of 
1987 dollars (“CAP” variable in the database) and number of employees (“EMP” variable in the database) 
per industry. As in Bustos (2011), factor intensity is then calculated CAP/EMP. 
20 We can assume that 1995 values are plausibly exogenous, as our sample starts only five years later, in 
2000. 
21 The box plot reported in Figure A.3 shows the distribution of coefficients for each type of trade 
agreements: 3.a shows the coefficients relative to trade agreements without labor provisions; 3.b shows 
the coefficients relative to trade agreements with “weak” labor provisions; 3.c shows the coefficients 
relative to trade agreements with “strong” labor provisions. For each group, the graph shows the median 
(the line within the box), the 25th and 75th percentile range (the limits of the box), and the upper and lower 
adjacent values (lines emerging from the box, above and below respectively). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2017
Second, the relation between the distribution of coefficients in the same quartile of 
capital intensity across different type of agreements. The effects of trade agreements 
for sectors in the first quartile of the distribution of capital intensity, i.e. more labor 
intensive sectors, tend to be higher for trade agreements without labor provisions, and 
lower for trade agreements with strong labor provisions. As expected, the opposite is 
true for sectors in the third quartile of the distribution of capital intensity, i.e. more 
capital intensive sectors. 
There is one exception to what we discussed above, the effects of trade agreements for 
sectors in the fourth quartile of the distribution of capital intensity, i.e. the group 
including the most capital intensive sectors. For sectors with very high capital intensity, 
the median effect of any type of trade agreement (without, with weak, and with strong 
labor provisions) is very close to zero. This finding can be rationalized recalling the (very) 
limited importance (and international competitiveness) of very high capital intensive 
sectors in emerging and developing economies. Therefore, for such sectors, the change 
in the “institutional comparative advantage” granted by a trade agreement would not 
be enough to guarantee significant changes in exports. 
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